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Workers’ remittances have become a major source of income for developing countries. However, 
little is still known about their impact on poverty and inequality. Using a large cross-country 
panel dataset, we find that remittances in Latin American and Caribbean (LAC) countries have 
increased growth and reduced inequality and poverty. These results are robust to the use of 
different instruments that attempt to correct for the potential endogeneity of remittances. 
Household survey-based estimates for ten LAC countries confirm that remittances have negative 
albeit relatively small inequality and poverty reducing effects, even after imputations for the 
potential home earnings of migrants. 
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Flows of workers’ remittances have become a major source of external finance for 
developing countries. During the past ten years, the growth of remittances has outpaced that of 
private capital flows and official development assistance. In 2004, remittances to developing 
countries totaled about US$144 billion, and were equivalent to about 5 percent of imports and 8 
percent of domestic investment. They reached almost 90 percent of FDI and were larger than 
official flows and private non-FDI flows.
2 Remittances are especially important in Latin 
America. With flows of US$40 billion in 2004 and 27 percent of all remittances to developing 
countries, Latin America is currently the top remittance receiving region in the world. With an 
annual growth rate of 15 percent over the past 15 years, Latin America has also experienced 
among the highest rates of growth in remittances inflows, trailing only East Asia.  
 
Given the magnitude, stability and potentially beneficial macroeconomic effects of 
workers’ remittances, the growing interest in the topic among development practitioners should 
not come as a surprise. Yet, very little is still known about the poverty and inequality impact of 
these flows. Microeconomic evidence based on household survey data suggests that remittances 
are generally associated with reductions in poverty,
3  but they may increase or decrease income 
inequality depending on the initial level of migration of sending communities.
4 Several of the 
existing studies, however, are based on rural and village-level data
5 and only one focuses on a 
nationally representative survey for a Latin American country. 
 
At the cross national level there are, to the best of our knowledge, only two recent studies 
(Adams and Page, 2005, and World Economic Outlook, 2005) that have looked at this issue. 
Both of them find that countries that receive remittances have lower poverty levels. Adams and 
Page find that a 10 percent increase in per capita remittances would lead to a 3.5 percent decline 
in the share of people living in poverty in the corresponding country. World Economic Outlook 
(2005), on the other hand, finds that a 2.5 percentage point increase in the remittances to GDP 
ratio is associated with a 0.5 percentage point decrease in poverty.  
 
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of remittances on poverty and 
inequality along several dimensions, using both aggregate country-level data and nationally 
representative household surveys for ten Latin American and Caribbean (Latin American 
hereafter) countries. First, we complement previous cross-country studies by using an 
econometric approach that allows us to estimate the separate impact of remittances on each of 
                                                 
2 See Global Economic Prospects (2006). 
3 See, among others, Adams (2004, 2006) respectively on Guatemala and Ghana, Lopez-Córdova (2005) and Taylor 
et al. (2005) on Mexico, and Yang and Martinez (2006) on the Philippines. 
4 This is the conclusion reached by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) and Taylor, Mora and Adams (2005) using 
data from rural Mexico. Other papers, however, have concluded that remittances have the effect of increasing 
income inequality: see for instance Adams (1989, 2006) on Egypt and Ghana, respectively, Barham and Boucher 
(1998) on Nicaragua, and Rodriguez (1998) on the Philippines. 
5 The exceptions are the papers on the Philippines, Ghana and Guatemala. The data used by Lopez-Córdova (2005) 
is also nationally representative but it is aggregated at the municipal level. 
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the two potential drivers of poverty:
6 average income growth and income inequality. This is 
important because as noted in World Economic Outlook (2005) estimates of the poverty effects 
of remittances based on regressions that control for per capita GDP and indexes of income 
inequality – such as those in Adams and Page and the World Economic Outlook – can be 
substantially biased as they miss the effects that operate through changes in average income or 
inequality. 
 
Second, unlike previous cross-country studies we introduce some degree of country 
heterogeneity in the analysis. Thus, in our regression estimates we allow the impact of 
remittances on growth and inequality to be different for Latin American countries. Moreover, 
when mapping the estimated effects of remittances on growth and inequality on the 
corresponding impact of remittances on poverty, we take into consideration each country’s initial 
level of inequality and development.
7 
 
Third, in contrast to previous cross-country analysis of this topic, we exploit in our 
estimates the panel nature of the data, thus allowing for the possible existence of fixed effects, 
motivated for instance by time-invariant unobserved country characteristics. Moreover, we 
perform our estimation in a dynamic panel framework, using both internal and external time-
varying variables to instrument for remittances. We are able to introduce some of these statistical 
refinements thanks to the larger availability of data on inequality and growth data, in comparison 
with the limited samples that are available in poverty databases.  
 
Fourth, using household survey data for ten Latin American countries with quite different 
migration patterns, we estimate the effects of discrete and marginal changes in remittances on 
household income inequality. In this respect, we first make the assumption that remittances 
operate as exogenous transfers by migrants, and thus consider the counterfactual scenario of 
changes in remittances without changes in migration. 
 
Fifth, to complement the above estimates, we compare observed levels of poverty and 
inequality with the levels that would prevail in the counterfactual scenario of no-migration and 
no-remittances. We pursue this alternative on the basis of the more realistic assumption that 
remittances are a potential substitute for home earnings, which we impute based on samples of 
non-migrant households, in a selection-corrected estimation framework. 
 
To anticipate some of our main results, our cross-country estimates suggest that 
remittances have a positive and statistically significant effect on growth that is of a similar 
magnitude in Latin America and in the rest of the world. This result is robust to the use of 
different instruments (internal and external) for the indicator of remittances. The evidence on the 
impact of remittances on inequality, however, is somewhat more mixed. For the typical country 
in the global sample we find that remittances tend to increase the level of income inequality. On 
                                                 
6 In what follows all references to poverty should be understood as references to headcount poverty. The qualitative 
results of this paper, however, can be extended without loss of generality to the other two Foster, Greer and 
Thorbecke (1984)  poverty measures (the poverty gap and the squared poverty gap).  
7 As argued by, among others Lopez and Serven (2006), the impact of growth and changes in inequality on poverty 
reduction depends on the country’s initial level of inequality and development. In other words, even if remittances 
had the same impact on growth and inequality in every country they could still have a different impact on poverty 
levels. 
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the other hand, we find that in the typical Latin American country remittances slightly reduce 
inequality or leave it unchanged depending on the particular specification.  
 
By combining the results on the effects of remittances on growth and inequality with 
initial country conditions, we find that remittances generally lower poverty. However, the 
elasticity of poverty reduction with respect to remittances differs significantly by country. For 
instance, we find that depending on the countries’ different initial levels of inequality and 
development, the percentage reduction in poverty for a 10 percent increase in the ratio of 
remittances to GDP could range from about .04 percent (poorer countries) to .5 percent (richer 
countries). Equivalently, considering than in the Latin American region remittances represent on 
average 4.9 percent of GDP, these results would imply that for every percentage point increase in 
the remittances to GDP ratio, poverty in the typical Latin American country would fall by about 
.37 percent.  
 
As for our micro-econometric results, we find that in 8 out of 10 countries the observed 
Gini coefficient of per capita household income is smaller than the Gini that would prevail in the 
absence of remittances, for given non-remittances income. The changes, however, would be 
generally small, averaging less than 2 percent of the initial Gini
8 for the countries in which 
inequality is estimated to decrease as a result of remittances, and less than 0.2 percent in those in 
which it increases. For marginal changes in remittances, we find that in 6 out of 10 countries 
inequality would increase as a result of small ceteris paribus increases in those flows of income, 
a result that is driven by the fact that remittances are generally more unequally distributed than 
non-remittances income and with a few exceptions they have a high correlation with total 
income.  
 
When imputing non-remittances income in the counterfactual scenario of non-migration, 
our results suggest that in six countries migration and remittances have an even less equalizing 
effect. However, in the other four countries, where migrants tend to come from the upper 
segments of the income and educational distributions, the evidence is quite the opposite, with 
migration and remittances now reducing inequality much more than before. As for the 
simulations of the poverty effects of remittances and migration, they show that attempts to 
estimate the poverty-reducing effect of remittances based only on the analysis of observed non-
remittances income grossly over-estimate those effects. On average, when moving from the no-
remittances to the non-migration counterfactual scenarios, the reduction in extreme poverty as a 
result of migration and remittances falls from 14 to 3 percent and that in moderate poverty from 
8 to 3 percent. Thus, the results based on micro data also indicate a moderate impact of 
remittances on poverty: on average for the 10 countries in our sample extreme and moderate 
poverty would fall by respectively 0.37 and 0.4 percent for every 1 percentage point increase in 
the remittances to GDP ratio, a finding that is surprisingly close to the one obtained on the basis 
of cross-country regressions. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review the empirical 
strategy adopted in our cross-country estimates, including a discussion on the links between 
changes in poverty, growth and inequality, and a summary of the challenges involved in the 
estimation of a dynamic panel data models with country specific effects. Section 3 presents the 
                                                 
8 Or about 1 percentage point for a typical Gini of .5. 
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basic characteristics of our cross-country data and summarizes the corresponding empirical 
results. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy adopted in the micro-econometric section of 
the paper. Section 5 presents the household survey data used in the paper and the respective 
empirical results. Finally, section 6 offers concluding remarks.  
 
2. CROSS-COUNTRY EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
(a) Poverty, growth, and inequality 
 
In this section we use simple techniques to show that under fairly general conditions the 
degree of poverty in any given country can be expressed as function of two factors: the average 
income level of the country and the extent of income inequality, so that to the extent that 
remittances raise income levels or lower income inequality they will also contribute to lower 
poverty.  
 
Formally, consider the Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (FGT) (1984) family of poverty 
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where  } 2 , 1 , 0 { ∈ α  is a parameter of inequality aversion, z is the poverty line, x is income, and f(.) 
is the density function of income. When α = 0, (1) reduces to the familiar headcount ratio, which 
measures the share of the population below the poverty line z. When α = 1, it measures the 
poverty gap and when α = 2, it measures the squared poverty gap. 
 
Assume now that income follows a log normal distribution
9 (i.e. log x is normally 
distributed). In that case, Lopez and Serven (2006) show that (i)  ) , ( G Y P P α α =  where Y and G 




















φ  can be expressed as functions of z, Y and G; and (iii)  0 < γ and if z<Y (i.e. if the 
poverty line is smaller than average income levels)  0 > φ . Moreover, when Lopez and Serven 
(2006) compare the theoretical quintile shares according to a log-normal distribution with their 
empirical counterparts using data from 794 household surveys they find that the log-normal 
approximation fits the empirical data extremely well, to the point that they formally test the null 
hypothesis that income follows a log normal distribution are unable to reject such null 
hypothesis. 
                                                 
9 Attempts to model the size distribution of income using a log normal distribution have a long tradition in the 
economics literature, dating back to Gibrat (1931). Gibrat (1931) provided a theoretical justification for this 
particular functional form and presented empirical evidenced indicating that the log normal distribution offered a 
good empirical fit to the observed distribution of income. Gibrat’s work was followed by other works extending his 
basic theoretical framework and offering additional empirical evidence (Kalecki, 1945, Rutherford, 1955).  
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With these elements in mind, a change in poverty due to a change in remittances (which 































































.                    (3) 
 
According to equation (3), the impact of a change in remittances, R, on poverty will 
depend on: (i) the impact that R has on growth; (ii) how growth is translated into poverty 
reduction; (iii) the simultaneous impact that R has on inequality (as measured by the Gini 
coefficient), and finally (iv) how inequality changes are translated into poverty reduction.. 
Clearly, the usefulness of expression (3) for empirical work still requires knowledge about how 
remittances translate into income growth and changes in income inequality. We discuss this issue 
next. 
 
(b) The impact of remittances on growth and inequality 
 
In order to estimate the links between remittances and growth in the data, our empirical 
strategy is based on the addition of a measure of remittances to an otherwise standard empirical 
growth regression:  
 
it i it it it it it r x y y y υ ν β ω δ + + + + = − − − − 1 1 1 ' ) ( ,                  (4) 
 
where y is the log of per capita income,  r is a measure of remittances, x represents a set of 
control variables other than lagged income, which we shall discuss shortly,  i ν  is a country-
specific effect, and it υ  is an i.i.d. error term.  
 
According to (4), growth depends on initial income, remittances and current and/or 
lagged values of the control variables. Our primary focus is to assess the nature and magnitude of 
the estimate of β in equation (4). If remittances have a positive impact on growth we should find 
β > 0, whereas if they have no impact on growth we might find β=0.  
 
One limitation of the previous specification is that it imposes the same slope β for all the 
countries in the sample. To both allow for some heterogeneity and test whether the basic results 
would hold for a Latin American sub-sample the empirical section considers the following 
variation of (4): 
 
it i i it it it it it it lac r r x y y y υ ν β β ω δ + + × + + + = − − − − − 1 2 1 1 1 1 ' ) (                 (5) 
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where lac is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the country in question is in the Latin 
American region and 0 otherwise. Thus the impact of remittances on growth for Latin America 
would be given by β1+β2. 
 
As for the impact of remittances on inequality, we follow a similar strategy and estimate 
the following specification: 
  
it i i it it it it it it lac r r x g g g ε μ α α χ λ + + × + + + = − − − − − 1 2 1 1 1 1 '     (6) 
 
where g is the (logged) Gini coefficient, and  i μ  and it ε  are a country-specific effect, and an i.i.d. 
error term. Analogous to equation (5), the impact of remittances on the changes in inequality for 
Latin America would be given by α1+α2. 
 
(c) Econometric issues 
 
In equations (5) and (6) above, the variable for remittances is pre-determined, which in 
principle should help alleviate concerns with simultaneity. This in turn should offer some 
reassurance that empirical estimates of β and α capture the effect of remittances on growth and 
inequality rather than the impact of growth or inequality on migration and hence on remittances.  
 
However, the estimation of equations (5) and (6) still has to overcome two main 
challenges, namely the presence of (unobserved) country-specific effects potentially correlated 
with the explanatory variables, and the possible simultaneity of some of the control variables 
with growth. To address the first of these issues Arellano and Bond (1991) propose differencing 
the equations to eliminate the country specific effect so that, after rearranging, (5), say, can be 
rewritten as: 
 
) ( ) (
) ( ) ( ' ) )( 1 ( ) (
1 2 1 2
2 1 1 1 2 1 1
− − −
− − − − − −
− + − +
− + − + − + = −
it it i it i it
it it it it it it it it
lac r lac r
r r x x y y y y
ν ν β
β ω δ
                (7) 
 
which relates changes in the growth rate to changes in remittances and the control variables. If δ 
= 0 and the x variables are exogenous, OLS on (7) will yield consistent estimates. But if δ is not 
equal to zero, and/or some or all of the x are determined simultaneously with y, the OLS 
estimates will be inconsistent, and an instrumental variable procedure is needed to obtain 
consistent estimates of the parameters.  
 
Absent exogenous variables that can provide external instruments, a GMM estimator 
based only on internal instruments can be constructed along the lines of Arellano and Bover 
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), who propose a system estimator combining the 
regressions in differences and levels. To compute the system estimator, predetermined and 
endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels, 
while variables in levels are instrumented with suitable lags of their own first differences.
10  
                                                 
10 A well-known shortcoming of panel GMM estimators in small samples is their tendency to result in over-fitting 
and downward-biased standard errors —a consequence of the large number of instruments available for estimation 
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In this context, however, there is the possibility of finding instruments that can be 
considered exogenous and yet be correlated with remittances. In this regard we employ both 
internal instruments based on lagged levels and first differences of the remittances variable, and 
two types of external instruments based on the economic conditions of the countries in which 
most remittances to developing countries originate. The first variable is based on the per capita 
GDP of each of the top ten migrant receiving countries of the world, weighted by the inverse of 
the distance to these ten countries from each remittance receiving country in our sample. We will 
refer to this series as the Distance variable. The second external instrumental variable is based on 
the real GDP per capita of the five OECD countries that are the top receivers of migrants for 
each remittance receiving country, weighted by the share of migration from the corresponding 
country to each of those five OECD destinations.  We refer to this series as the Migration series. 
In each case, we consider as potential instruments the (logged) level of the variables at the 
beginning of the period and the growth rates over the period under consideration.
11  
 
The consistency of the GMM estimator above depends on the validity of the assumption 
that the error terms do not exhibit serial correlation as well as on the validity of the instruments.  
We present two specification tests to address these issues. The first is the Sargan test of 
overidentifying restrictions. The second test examines whether the error term  it υ  in (7) is not 
serially correlated, which in turn would imply that the difference error in (9) does not present 
second-order serial correlation (SOSC). 
 
(d) Control variables 
 
We turn to the specification of the set of control variables included in x. There is a wide 
array of potential explanatory variables that can be used in this context.
12 In this paper, rather 
than adding to the already huge variety of growth models, we opt for considering a set that has 
already been used in a number of empirical growth studies. This is the one used by Perotti 
(1996), Forbes (2000), Banerjee and Duflo (2003), and Knowles (2005), and it includes the 
average years of secondary education of the male population, the average years of secondary 
education of the female population, and a measure of market distortions: the price of investment 
                                                                                                                                                             
(see, e.g., Ziliak 1997). To reduce this bias,  in the estimations below we limit the number of over identifying 
restrictions by building only one instrument from each variable and lag distance, rather than building one separate 
instrument from each variable, and lag distance in each time period.  
11 The basic intuition behind these instruments is that migrants tend to send more money to their home countries 
when they face improved economic conditions in the countries where they are established. Thus, higher growth in a 
given migrant-receiving country is likely to lead to increased remittances flows to countries that have a large share 
of their stock of migrants located in that country. Moreover, since the importance of each developed country as a 
destination for migrants of a given developing country is inversely correlated with the distance between those 
countries, the effect of growth in the former on the flows of remittances to the latter is likely to decrease with the 
distance between them. In other words, remittances will likely be positively related to growth in migrant destination 
countries, to the existing stock of migrants in those countries, and to the inverse of the distance between them. On 
the other hand, the proposed instruments are not likely to affect growth or inequality in migrant-sending countries, 
beyond their effect through changes in remittances flows.. 
12 As noted by Durlauf and Quah (1999), by 1998 the number of individual regressors that had been considered as 
potential explanatory variables in growth regressions exceeded the number of countries in the standard growth 
dataset. 
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goods relative to the one in the US. All these variables are measured in levels at the beginning of 
the period.  
 
This choice of regressors is motivated by three main considerations. First, we need a 
parsimonious model as the number of available observations dramatically falls once we estimate 
the equations for inequality, a variable for which data availability is quite limited. Second, this 
choice ensures comparability with existing work in the growth literature Third, the selected 
controls are relevant as explanatory variables both for our growth and inequality regressions. In 
this respect, even though Perotti (1996) justifies the selected regressors in a growth context, their 
relevance can also be defended as determinants of inequality. Indeed, education is usually seen 
as one of the main determinants of inequality and discriminating between female and male 
educational levels can also capture gender-related inequalities. Finally, the price of capital can 
capture incentives to substitute capital for labor.
13  
 
Clearly, omitted variable bias could be problematic if there is strong correlation between 
the dependent variable in question, the remittances variable and a third omitted variable. 
Moreover, given the large potential number of variables that could be included in a growth 
regression it is almost impossible to infer how omitted variables could affect the estimates of 
remittances, growth and inequality.  Here we have to admit that there is little that we can do 
other than, as stressed above, relying on a control set that has been extensively used in the 
literature, and on the fixed effects strategy to somewhat correct the problem, particularly when 
the omitted variables are time invariant or have low variability. 
 
3. CROSS-COUNTRY DATA AND RESULTS 
 
(a) Cross-Country Data 
 
We use data for 59 industrial and developing countries spanning the years 1970-2000. All 
the regressions are performed using non-overlapping five year periods. The education variables 
come from the Barro and Lee (2001) database, income and the proxy for market distortions are 
from the PWT6.1 database, and the Gini indices are from Dollar and Kraay (2002). Remittances 
data are as in Aggarwal, Demirguc-Kunt, and Martinez Peria (2005) and the data come from the 
World Economic Outlook (2005). With some exceptions, these data are constructed as the sum 
of three items in the Balance of Payment Statistics Yearbook (IMF):  workers’ remittances 
(current transfers made by migrants who are employed and resident in another economy); 
compensation of employees (wages, salaries and other benefits earned by nonresident workers for 
work performed for resident of other countries); and migrant transfers (financial items that arise 
from the migration or change of residence of individuals from one economy to another). Once 
we bring all the variables together we end up with a sample of 221 observations in the growth 
regressions and a sample of 85 observations in the specifications for the Gini coefficient.  To a 
large extent the difference in the size of these samples is driven by the different coverage of the 
income and inequality variables.
14  
                                                 
13 Clearly, as in the case of the growth equation, there are many other variables that one could potentially consider as 
determinants of inequality, including the age profile of the population, the country’s fertility rate, etc.  
14 In fact, whereas the PWT6.1 allows for the construction of more than 700 5-year observations for the growth 
variable between 1970 and 2000, the Dollar and Kraay (2002) database only allows for 274 observations for the 
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(b) Growth and Inequality Results 
 
The results of estimating the growth equation (7) are reported in table 1. Each column 
reports the results that are obtained when the GMM estimator described above is implemented 
using a different instrument set. The estimation in column (1) is based on internal instruments 
only. Columns (2) to (7) use in addition to the internal instruments for the control variables 
(female and male education and the cost of investment) one exogenous variable (either Distance 
of Migration) that can enter in the instrument set in levels, growth rates, or both. In all cases the 
validity of the chosen instrumental variables is confirmed by the Sargan and second order serial 
correlation tests, which do not reveal any serious misspecification problem.
15 
 
TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Inspection of this table indicates that remittances tend to have a positive and statistically 
significant effect on growth regardless of the instrument set used. The estimated slopes range 
between .005 and .013, implying that doubling the share of remittances in GDP would on 
average increase growth by between .5 and 1.3 percentage points. The finding that higher 
remittances would lead to higher growth holds both for the typical country of the world and for 
the average Latin American and Caribbean country. Indeed, the interaction term between 
remittances and the Latin America dummy is not statistically different from zero, implying that 
the impact of remittances on growth is the same in Latin America and the rest of the world..  
 
Regarding the coefficients of the other control variables, as expected the proxy for the 
cost of capital carries a negative coefficient although it is not always significantly different from 
zero. In turn, the education variables carry coefficients of opposite signs, in line with the findings 
of other studies such as Perotti (1996), Forbes (2000) and Knowles (2005).
 16 The only somewhat 




In sum, the results that emerge from table 1 would suggest that remittances are good for 
growth.  We next address whether remittances are also good for income inequality. Table 2 
reports the results of estimating model (8) and we start by noting that, as in the growth equation 
case, the specification tests do not indicate any particular misspecification problem. However, 
unlike in the previous case, the results are now more mixed. For example, when we use the 
Distance-level, Distance-growth and Migration-growth instruments we do find that, at the global 
level, remittances tend to be associated with higher levels of inequality but do not find a 
significant impact for Latin America. With the rest of instruments we still find a positive impact 
on the Gini coefficient at the global level, but now the Latin American specific impact is 
                                                                                                                                                             
changes in the gini variable for that same period. The problem is subsequently compounded when we cross these 
two variables with the rest of the database. 
15 The results of the estimation remain virtually unchanged when we include among the regressors a time effect to 
account for the effect of common events to all countries in the sample. 
16 See e.g., Table 4 in Perotti (1996), Table 4 in Forbes (2000) and Tables 1 and 3 in Knowles (2005). Perotti (1996) 
explains this noting that “lower initial female attainment, indicates more backwardness and therefore faster 
subsequent growth as the economy converges toward its steady state” (Perotti, 1996, p.159).. 
17  Note, however, that using a similar specification Knowles (2005) has also failed to find evidence of cross-country 
conditional convergence. 
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negative and significant. In other words, while for the average country of the world increase in 
remittances would lead to higher income inequality, the effect for the average Latin American 
country is either negative or non-significant depending on the specific choice of instruments. 
This result can be interpreted in light of the fact that remittances are more likely to have an 
equalizing effect on income when they are directed to a larger extent to households in the lower 
quintiles of the income distribution. In particular, the above results are consistent with migration 
costs in Latin America being lower with respect to per capita income than in other regions of the 
developing world, possibly because of smaller distances to migrant destinations or because of 
long standing migration networks – e.g. as in the case of the Mexico-U.S. corridor. 
 
TABLE 2 HERE 
 
As for the magnitudes of the effects of remittances on the Gini coefficient, we find that 
they are very similar to those found for growth, at least for the average country in the sample, in 
which doubling the share of remittances would lead to increases of between 0.5 and 1.1 percent 
in the Gini coefficient. Note, however, that in the case of the average Latin American country, 
remittances have a positive effect on growth but a negative or non-significant effect on 
inequality. In the case of this region, considering only the specifications that yield significant 
remittances effects, the later are such that an hypothetical one percentage point increase in the 
remittances to GDP ratio for a country where that share is 4.9 percent – as in the average Latin 
American country – would lead to a reduction in the Gini of between 0.06 and 0.12 percent. 
 
(c) Poverty Results 
 
The previous discussion would indicate that remittances would lead to lower poverty in 
Latin America. This is illustrated in table 3 which reports the poverty elasticity with respect to 
the remittances to GDP ratio obtained for the average Latin American country, for each of the 
specifications used. In building this table we have made use of the estimates for the impact of 
remittances on growth and inequality reviewed above and of estimates for γ  and φ in equation 
(5) derived under log-normality and taken from Lopez and Serven (2006).
18  
 
TABLE 3 HERE 
 
Evidence in Table 3 indicates that there is substantial heterogeneity of results depending 
upon the country’s initial conditions, as given by the ratio of per capita income to the poverty 
line, and the Gini coefficient. This reflects the different values that the growth and inequality 
elasticities of poverty take as those initial conditions change (see Lopez and Serven, 2006 for a 
discussion). In fact, depending on the model being used and on the initial conditions, a 10 
percent increase in the share remittances in GDP would lead to a reduction in poverty that varies 
from 0.03 to 1.5 percent – respectively for countries with high and low levels of both inequality 
and development. In the Latin American context, however, this range can be substantially 
narrowed as most countries in the region have Gini coefficients of around 0.5.
19 Thus, 
considering that in the average Latin American country remittances are 4.9 percent to GDP, a 
                                                 
18 Note that these results rely on the log normality assumption of income and that other assumptions would produce 
other results.  
19 See for example Figure 4.7 in Perry et al. (2006). 
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one percentage point increase in the remittances to GDP ratio is estimated to lead to reductions in 
poverty that vary between 0.08 percent for poorer countries to 1.12 percent for richer countries, 
with an average estimated reduction of 0.37 percent.
20 
 
4. MICRO-ECONOMETRIC EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
(a) Inequality Decompositions 
 
As argued in the seminal paper by Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986), the impact of 
migration and international remittances on income inequality depends on the magnitude of 
remittances in relation to income from other sources and upon the position of remittance-
receiving households in the distribution of income. In their perspective, the uncertainty, net 
expected benefits and the distributional impact of migration “investments” depend, at any point 
in time, on past migration flows.  
 
In particular, when migration is incipient, its costs and related uncertainty are likely to be 
high, so that migrants can be expected to come from among the better off. As a result, at this 
point remittances would tend to have an un-equalizing effect. Over time, however, the 
uncertainty and costs involving migration are likely to diminish with the spread of information 
and contacts across a wider range of households, which may lead to increases in migration 
among the worse off, with potentially favorable effects on income inequality. 
 
To illustrate their hypothesis, Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) proposed a 
decomposition of income inequality that allows estimating the effects of discrete and marginal 
changes in remittances on the distribution of household income. We use this as a first approach 
to uncovering the link between remittances and inequality on the basis of household survey data 
from 10 Latin American countries.
21 It must be noted, however, that this approach entails the 
assumption that remittances operate as exogenous transfers by migrants, so that the implicit 
counterfactual scenario is that of changes in remittances without changes in migration. In other 
words, initially we do not consider the fact that migration also entails losses of income associated 
with the migrants’ absence from their communities. 
 
Following Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986), let yk represent the different k components 
of household income (i.e., non-remittances and remittances income). The Gini coefficient for any 
particular income source k can be written as: 
 









                      (8)   
 
                                                 
20 This is the estimated poverty effect of one percentage point increase in the remittances to GDP ratio in a country 
where that ratio is 4.9 percent and the Gini Coefficient is 0.5, using the average poverty elasticity from all 
alternative choices of instrumental variables reported in table 3. 
21 This type of decomposition has been used, among others, by Rodriguez (1998) and by Barham and Boucher 
(1998). 
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where F(yk) represents the cumulative distribution of income source k, and μk denotes country 
mean income. Defining GT as the Gini coefficient of total income, the properties of covariance 
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where Sk is the country’s share of income source k on total income, and Rk is the Gini correlation 
of component k with total income, i.e.: 
 
 
( ) [ ]
() [] k k
T k
k y F y COV





      ( 1 0 )  
 
Stark, Taylor and Yitzhaki (1986) also show that this formulation can be used to calculate 
the effect of a small percentage change in one source of income – e.g. remittances – on the Gini 
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which shows that an infinitesimal change in income k has equalizing (un-equalizing) effects if 
the share of the Gini explained by that income source is smaller than its share in total income. 
 
(b) No-Migration Counterfactual 
 
The results of the above inequality decompositions can arguably be misleading if one 
assumes that remittances are not exogenous transfers but rather they substitute for the home 
earnings that migrants would have had if they had not decided to leave their countries to work 
abroad. In particular, in this approach the non-remittances income reported by households with 
migrants is not a good representation of the situation of the family prior to migration. In effect, if 
the migrant had positive earnings before leaving the household, it is likely that household’s total 
non-remittances income is lower after migration. Thus, estimating the effect of migration and 
remittances on inequality would require taking into consideration the counterfactual per capita 
income that the household would have had if the migrant had stayed at home.  
 
To address this issue, we impute per capita household income for migrant families in the 
counterfactual scenario of no remittances and no migration.
22 We do this by predicting per capita 
income levels for households with remittances on the basis of a reduced-form specification for 
                                                 
22  Previous papers that have attempted to make corrections with a similar approach – although with different 
estimation and simulation methodologies – are Adams (1989, 2004, 2006), Rodriguez (1998), and Barham and 
Boucher (1998).  
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the determinants of income among households without remittances. The estimated model is the 
following: 
 
i i i i H X Y μ γ β α + + + = log                     (12) 
 
where Yi represents per capita non-remittances income, Xi is a vector of household characteristics 
(demographic and location covariates), Hi is a set of characteristics of the household head, and μi 
is unobserved heterogeneity in income generation. The procedure consists on estimating equation 
(12) for the sub sample of households that do not receive remittances. The estimated coefficients 
allow predicting the counterfactual non-migration income for remittances-recipient households. 
In order to avoid the reduction in income variability for migrant families due to the used of 
predicted values, we follow Barham and Boucher (1998) in adding to the predicted values of 
income a simulated error component.  
 
Several issues need to be discussed. First, in the absence of information on migrant 
characteristics – which is the case in eight out of our ten countries – it is necessary to make some 
basic assumptions about the number and the demographics of migrants. In this respect, we follow 
Rodriguez (1998) in assuming that on average remittances are sent by an adult male family 
member, who has the average years of education of other adults in the household. The 
assumption that the remittance sender is a male relative is justified by the fact that the surveys 
for Haiti and Nicaragua, which contain information on migrants’ demographics, indicate that 
respectively 74 and 61 percent of households that receive remittances have at least one adult 
male migrant abroad that is a close relative or part of the extended family, and 80 and 99 of the 
remaining recipient households have an adult female migrant that is a close family member (the 
Haitian survey only reports close migrant family members). On the other hand, the assumption 
that remittances are sent by just one migrant can be considered to be a conservative one, as at 
least in Haiti and Nicaragua recipient households report, on average, respectively 2.2 and 1.8 
adult migrants living abroad. Our assumption regarding the schooling of migrants also appears to 
be on the conservative side, as the Nicaraguan survey suggests that adult migrants have slightly 
higher average years of education (7.7) than non-migrant adult household members (6.7 years) – 
which may also lead to a small under-estimation of counterfactual non-remittances income.
23  
 
Second, OLS estimates of equation (12) would be inconsistent if μi is not independently 
identically distributed (i.i.d.). In other words, if migrants are not randomly selected from the pool 
of households, estimates of equation (12) based on the sample of households without migrants 
could suffer from selection bias. To control for possibility, we add a variable that represents the 
“propensity to migrate”, in the context of the two-step estimation framework proposed by 
Heckman (1979).
24 In particular, we adopt the following model specification: 
 
  
                                                 
23 The Haitian survey does not allow for such a comparison of schooling levels between migrants and their relatives. 
Moreover, potentially compensating the above mentioned effects of our assumptions, it must be noted that for the 
minority of recipient households who report not having adult migrants that are close relatives – 8 percent in 
Nicaragua – we are probably over-estimating their counterfactual income in the absence of migration and 
remittances, as the remittance sender probably did not live in the household prior to migrating.  
24 A similar approach is followed in Barham and Boucher (1998) and Adams (2006). 
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11 1 * ii i i i MX H Z α βγω μ =+ + + +                        (13)  
(no-remittances selection rule) 
 
i i i i i H X Y ε θλ γ β α + + + + = 2 2 2 log                    (14) 
(earnings equation for non-recipient families) 
 
We only observe the sign of the variable Mi*, which represents the selection rule for not 
receiving remittances i.e. we observe only whether the household receives remittances or not, 
which in turns is equivalent to a negative or positive value for Mi*. Identification of this model 
requires an exclusion restriction: a set of variables Zi that are related to the migration and 
remittances choice but which do not directly affect earnings for households without -migrants. 
The term  i λ  is the selection inverse Mill’s ratio, defined as: 
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() i i i i i i Z H X E ω γ β μ ν θλ − − − > = 1 1 /                                           (16) 
 
where  i μ  is the error component in the earning equations and  ) var( / ) , cov( i i i μ μ ν θ = . 
 
Controlling for  i λ  allows the remaining unexplained component  i ε  to have the usual 
desirable i.i.d. properties. If  i λ  is a significant predictor of earnings, it suggests that the selection 
into the non-migration status is indeed correlated with factors that affect the household earnings 
– and that OLS estimates of equation (12) would be inconsistent. 
 
The exclusion restrictions that we employ for the no-remittances selection equation are an 
index of household assets, the percentage of households that receive remittances in the respective 
county of residence (a proxy for the presence of migrant networks), and their interaction. When 
county level indicators cannot be calculated (Guatemala and Haiti), the variable that represents 
the percentage of households with remittances is measured at the department/province level. In 
this case, only the interaction of that variable with the household assets index is included. 
Finally, when information on household assets is missing (Bolivia, Ecuador and Honduras), the 




                                                 
25 Our motivation for using the interaction between migrant networks with household assets or the number of adult 
males (when information on household assets is missing) is to allow migrant networks to have a different effect on 
households with different predispositions to migrate in the first place. In this respect, households with a larger 
number of adult males have a higher likelihood of sending migrants abroad, while the same is true for those with 
more assets, whom are more likely to be able to afford the costs of migration. 
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With the assumption stated before concerning migrant characteristics, these coefficients 
are used in order to impute the counterfactual non-remittances per capita household income for 
recipient families. With this variable one can proceed to calculate the levels of poverty and 
inequality that would have prevailed had migration and remittances not taken place. It must be 
noted, however, that as mentioned by Rodriguez (1998) the variance of the counterfactual 
income predicted on the basis of observable household characteristics is artificially small, 
because it ignores unobserved determinants of income.  
 
A potential solution proposed by Barham and Boucher (1998) is to add to the predicted 
household income a random error component drawn from a distribution with the same properties 
(mean, variance) of the actual estimated errors. We pursue this approach and obtain 1,000 
different estimates of the imputed counterfactual non-remittances income for families with 
migrants, and the same number of estimates for the poverty and inequality levels that would have 
prevailed in the above counterfactual scenario. This allows us to report not only  point estimates 
for those variables but also 95% confident intervals, based on the 25th and 975th estimates of the 
variables – after sorting them ascending order.    
 




We use household surveys data for 10 Latin American and Caribbean countries: Bolivia, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru. 
These countries were selected as they have recent household survey data with questions on 
remittance receipts. Our interest in these countries is also driven by the fact that, as it emerges 
from Figure 1, most rank among the top receivers in the region in terms of remittances to GDP 
ratio in 2004 (Haiti, Honduras, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Ecuador). Moreover, as 
shown in the lower panel of figure 1, Mexico is the top LAC receiver of remittances and one of 
the world’s top receivers in absolute terms (18.1 billion USD in 2004). Finally, Paraguay, 
Bolivia and Peru are also interesting cases as they generate considerable flows of South-South 
migration, which we are interested in comparing with the more traditional South-North pattern. 
 
All the household surveys that we employ are nationally representative, they were 
performed between 2000 and 2004, and contain information on the amount of foreign 
remittances. It must be noted, however, that none of these surveys has a panel structure (i.e. none 
follows the same household over time) and only two contains detailed information on migrants 
(Haiti and Nicaragua). Household surveys are not uniform across countries. The issue of 
comparability is of great concern, although we have made all possible efforts by using similar 
definition of variables in each survey. Table 4 provides details on the household surveys 
employed.. In the definition of household income, in general all income sources are considered, 
with the exception of imputed own-housing rent.
26 
 
TABLE 4 HERE 
 
                                                 
26 The concepts employed for defining non-remittances income and the questions used to collect information on 
remittances are available upon request. 
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A remaining methodological remark is that, although it is well known that household 
consumption is a better proxy for well-being than income, we decided to use household income 
when computing poverty and inequality measures due to the following reasons: a) the interest in 
the evaluation of differential impacts by income source (i.e., non-remittances vs. remittances 
income); b) few countries in the region have survey data with questions on household 
consumption and expenditures, while all of them include information on income. 
 
(b) Inequality Decompositions 
 
Table 5 presents a decomposition of the Gini coefficient of total income calculated on the 
basis of equation (11). For each country the first two rows present statistics associated 
respectively with non-remittances income – labor income, capital gains and transfers within the 
country – and remittances. Those statistics include the corresponding share in total income, the 
Gini coefficient, the Gini correlation with total income – see equation (10) – and the absolute and 
relative contribution of each income source to the Gini of total income. The last column of the 
table presents the effects on total income inequality of marginal changes in each income source, 
calculated using equation (11). 
 
TABLE 5 HERE 
 
The first way of analyzing these results to determine whether remittances increase or 
decrease income inequality is by comparing the Gini coefficient in the absence of remittances, to 
the Gini coefficient of total income. With the exception of Nicaragua and Peru, all countries 
exhibit higher Gini coefficients for non-remittances income, suggesting that if remittances were 
exogenously eliminated – without any compensating change in other sources of income, for 
instance through the local earnings of would-be migrants – inequality would increase. 
Quantitatively, however, the estimated potential increases in the Gini coefficient are small, 
averaging 1.8 percent in the countries where inequality would decrease, and 0.2 percent in the 
two countries in which the Gini would decrease. The large potential change is found for El 
Salvador, where we find found that the Gini would increase from 0.486 to 0.514 in the absence 
of remittances. 
 
One of the factors that explain the small inequality reducing effect of remittances is the 
fact that their own distribution is generally very unequal. Thus, the Gini coefficient for 
remittances is found to be above 0.9 in all ten countries (as most households do not report 
receiving remittances). In some of them, however, the high inequality in the distribution of 
remittances is partially compensated by a low Gini correlation between remittances and total 
income, which increases the equalizing effect that those flows have on total income. This is the 
case of Mexico, where the Gini correlation of remittances with total income is 0.289, El Salvador 
(0.303), Paraguay (0.437) and Guatemala (0.541). Not surprisingly, we find that in these four 
countries a marginal increase in remittances has an equalizing albeit small effect on income 
inequality. In particular, it is estimated that a 10 percent increase in remittances would lead to an 
average reduction of 0.1 percent in the Gini of total income in those four countries. 
 
In contrast, in the other six countries, where remittances are more highly correlated with 
total income, the households that receive them are located mainly in the upper quintiles of the 
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income distribution. This is more clearly seen in Haiti, Nicaragua and Peru, and leads to very 
small reductions or even positive effects on income inequality in the hypothesis of the 
elimination of remittances. Moreover, we find that in those countries a marginal increase in 
remittances is associated with an increase in total income inequality: the Gini increases by 0.2 
percent on average for each 10 percent increase in remittances income. 
 
(c) Poverty and Inequality in No-Migration Counterfactual 
 
The estimates obtained for the two-step model described in equations (13) and (14) are 
available upon request. Nevertheless, we can anticipate that unlike in Barham and Boucher 
(1998) and Adams (2006), who found insignificant selection coefficients ( i λ ), in almost all cases 
(except Ecuador) the variable associated with the “propensity to not receive remittances” is 
positive and significant at 1 percent level, suggesting that recipient of remittances are not 
randomly selected from the complete pool of households. Moreover, it appears that households 
with a higher propensity to not migrate are more likely to have higher per capita income levels, 
which is consistent with the standard migration argument that potential migrants compare the 
returns at home and in their potential destination when deciding whether to work abroad.  
 
The rest of the coefficients have the expected signs. In the selection equation, larger 
families (in particular, with a higher number of adult males) are more likely to receive 
remittances (or migrate). On the other hand, a higher number of children or adult females are 
negatively related to the likelihood of migration and remittances receipts.
27 Higher educational 
levels are negatively related to remittances, except in Haiti and Honduras (where education has 
the opposite sign). The presence of migrant networks, proxied by the percentage of households 
with remittances in the area of residence, and a household assets index are also positive 
correlated with the likelihood of being a recipient.
28 In the earnings equation, as expected, 
education and demographic characteristics are strong significant predictors of income in non-
recipient households, explaining between 33 and 55% of income variability depending on the 
case.  
 
Table 6 shows the position of households that report receiving remittances in the 
distribution of income, defined in three alternative ways: non-remittances income, imputed non-
remittances income (in the no-migration counterfactual), and total observed income.
29 In general, 
when comparing the distribution of recipient families according to non-remittances income with 
the distribution along either imputed non-remittances income or total income, we observe that 
                                                 
27 The result that for a given number of adult males in the household, an increase in the number of children and/or 
adult females is associated with a lower probability of receiving remittances is consistent with the fact that children 
and females are less likely to be active in the labor market. Thus, households with many females and dependent 
children may be less willing to send migrants to work and remit money from abroad, both because they may less 
capable of paying the costs of migration, and because they may be less able to complement remittances with other 
local sources of labor income.  
28 The household assets index was constructed using First Principal Components technique. Asset holdings 
considered were (whenever data is available): number of rooms per adult equivalent; cement walls; cement/brick 
floors; W.C. inside property; access to water, electricity, and telephone services; and ownership of automobile, 
refrigerator, TV, VCR, washing machine, and sewing machine. 
29 The values reported for the counterfactual exercise are the mean results of the 1,000 imputation generation process 
using random draws in order to approximate unobserved heterogeneity. 
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recipients experience substantial upward shifts along the income distribution. For instance, 61 
percent of the Mexican households that receive remittances are in the first quintile of the 
distribution of observed non-remittances income, but that fraction falls to 25 and 26 percent for 
the other two income definitions. This confirms that as a measure of the counterfactual non-
migration income of recipients, the observed non-remittances income suffers from a substantial 
downward bias, presumably because recipient families loose significant income earners in the 
migration process. Similar results are found in all countries. 
 
TABLE 6 HERE 
 
Table 6 also serves as a characterization of the socioeconomic status of recipient families. 
Thus, it is clear that in some countries migrants and recipient families tend to come from definite 
socioeconomic segments of society. For instance, even after correcting for the potential 
downward bias in reported non-remittances income, both tables with actual and imputed values 
suggest that a higher proportion of migrants tend to come from the bottom of the income 
distribution in Mexico and Paraguay.
30 In contrast, for Haiti, Peru and Nicaragua, we find 
evidence that goes in the opposite direction: migrants seem to be “positively selected”, in the 
sense of coming from the upper quintiles of the income distribution. The evidence concerning 
negative selection in Mexico and Paraguay, and positive selection in Haiti, Peru and Nicaragua 
seems to be corroborated by the distribution of recipient families according to the average years 
of education of actual adult members and household assets index (Table 7). For the other 
countries the evidence is not conclusive, with migrants showing a more uniform distribution 
along the various measures of income/wealth/education. 
 
TABLE 7 HERE 
 
Table 8 shows estimates of the Gini coefficient using counterfactual imputed non-
remittances income for recipient families. The general trend is that remittances have an even less 
equalizing effect in comparison to what had been obtained when using reported non-remittances 
income. The equalizing effect of remittances is much lower in six out of ten countries. For two of 
them, Mexico and Paraguay, remittances now even seem to increase inequality – although the 
evidence is not conclusive in Paraguay, according to the 95% confidence interval on the imputed 
Gini before remittances.  
 
TABLE 8 HERE 
 
On the other hand, in Haiti, Guatemala, Nicaragua and Peru, where migrants come from 
the upper segments of the income and educational distribution, the evidence is quite the opposite. 
For these countries, remittances now reduce inequality much more than before. Thus, when 
calculated using imputed non-remittances income, the Gini coefficient “before remittances” is 
higher than the Gini for observed total income. The most notable difference is registered in Haiti: 
the fall in inequality with respect to the no-remittances scenario was of 0.09 percent, but the 
reduction in the Gini starting from the no-migration scenario is now found to be of 7.67 percent. 
In Nicaragua and Peru, the effect of remittances on inequality actually switches from positive to 
negative when using imputed as opposed to reported non-remittances income. 
                                                 
30 For the Mexican case, these results agree with Ibarraran and Lubotsky (2005). 
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The estimated elasticities of inequality with respect with the share of remittances in 
household income in the no-migration counterfactual are also reported in table 8. They vary from 
-0.91 for Guatemala and -0.74 in Nicaragua, to 0.16 and 0.37 for Paraguay and Mexico, 
respectively.
31 Overall, when one moves from the no-remittances to the no-migration 
counterfactuals the average inequality effect that results from a one percentage point increase in 
the remittances to GDP ratio falls (in absolute value) from 0.37 to 0.25. Even the later inequality 
effect, however, is twice as large as the highest estimates reported above for Latin America, on 
the basis of cross-country regressions. 
 
The results for Mexico, Paraguay and the other four countries for which remittances’ 
impact is minor or even favoring inequality are consistent with the findings of previous studies 
that have made attempts to calculate counterfactual pre-remittances income in remittances-
receiving families. Rodriguez (1998) found that the increase in inequality after remittances in the 
Philippines rises from 1.27 percent to 7.90 percent when using imputed income instead of 
reported values. Similarly Barham and Boucher (1998), for the case of Bluefields (Nicaragua), 
reported that the Gini for household income falls from 0.47 to 0.43 when using reported figures, 
but inequality actually rises from 0.38 to 0.43 after correcting the pre-remittances distribution 
using imputed income for migrant families.  
 
Table 9 reports simulations of the effects of remittances and migration on poverty levels. 
The results show that attempts to estimate the poverty-reducing effect of remittances based only 
on the analysis of observed non-remittances income grossly over-estimate those effects. We 
employ two commonly headcount poverty indicators, based on poverty lines of US$1 and US$2 
per person per day, measured at PPP values, corresponding respectively to “extreme” and 
“moderate” poverty.
32 The first columns on both the left and the right hand side panels show 
results without correcting for the potential home earnings of migrants – i.e. based on the 
counterfactual scenario of no-remittances but no change in migration. As expected, remittances 
lead to large reductions in poverty levels, especially in those countries where migrants tend to 
come from the lower quintiles of the income distribution – notably Mexico and El Salvador, 
where extreme poverty is estimated to fall by more than 35 percent and moderate poverty by 
respectively 15 and 21 percent. However, when observed levels of poverty are compared to the 
less simplistic scenario of no-migration – that is when imputations are made for the income of 
migrants – the levels of poverty reduction are much lower. The most striking case is again that of 
Mexico, where poverty is now found to increase as a result of migration.
33 
                                                 
31 These elasticities are calculated as the ratio between the percent change in inequality and the share of remittances 
in income in the corresponding country: e.g. for each 1 percent reduction in the remittances to income ratio of 
Guatemala, inequality is estimated to increase by 0.94 percent. 
32 The US$ 1 and US$ 2 a day are values measured in 1989 international prices and adjusted to local currency using 
purchasing power parities (PPP) to take into account local prices. Although these lines have been criticized, their 
simplicity and  lack of reasonable alternatives have made them the standard for international poverty comparisons. 
For instance, they are periodically presented in the World Development Indicators (World Bank). 
33 Large poverty reducing effects when using observed non-remittances income as a counterfactual are to some 
extent driven by the fact that many recipient households report very little or no non-remittances income. As 
previously discussed, to the extent that their income prior to migration was higher, for instance because more 
household members were active in the labor market (including the migrant), that approach leads to over-estimating 
the poverty reducing effects of remittances. We attempt to correct this problem by using as a counterfactual the 
households’ “potential income”, assuming that prior to migration they behaved like similar non-recipient households 
with the same probability of migration. However, it is worth noting that we may fail to capture unobserved 
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TABLE 9 HERE 
 
On average, when moving from the no-remittances to the non-migration counterfactual 
scenarios, the reduction in extreme poverty falls from 14 to 3 percent and that in moderate 
poverty from 8 to 3 percent. In terms of the average estimated impact of remittances on poverty, 
in the non-migration counterfactual, moderate and extreme poverty are estimated to fall by 
respectively .57 and .50 percent for every percentage point increase in the remittances to non-
remittances household income ratio. For comparison purposes with the cross country exercise, 
we have also computed the change in poverty in the counterfactual absence of migration and 
remittances, assuming that the actual ratio of the later to GDP is as measured by Balance of 
Payments data. In this case, the average impact on extreme and moderate poverty of a 1 
percentage point increase in the remittances to GDP ratio is estimated at respectively .37 and 
0.40 percent (i.e. fully in line with the cross country results). 
 
Regarding poverty gap and squared poverty gap, Table 10 summarizes the results which 
suggest that in general remittances tend to reduce the depth of poverty. Using reported income, 
just in one case (Peru) remittances are associated to a small increase in poverty depth. Again, 
Mexico and El Salvador are the countries in which remittances severely reduce poverty depth. 
On average, extreme and moderate poverty depth are reduced in 4 and 2 percentage points 
respectively after a 1 percentage point increase in the remittances to income ratio. Using imputed 
non-remittances income, poverty depth results re more varied, still decreasing after remittances 
in the majority of cases, but also showing many cases with inconclusive remittances’ impacts 
(switching sign in the confidence interval reported) and with a positive association between 
remittances and poverty depth (increasing extreme poverty depth in El Salvador, Honduras and 
Peru, and moderate poverty depth in Honduras). 
 
TABLE 10 HERE 
 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper has shown that migration and remittances have statistically significant poverty 
reducing effects that appear to operate mainly through increases in per capita income of 
remittances-receiving countries. Indeed, cross-country regressions suggest that while in Latin 
America remittances generally have the effect of reducing inequality, the corresponding changes 
are generally small in magnitude. Thus, reductions in poverty are achieved mostly through the 
higher levels of income of migrant-sending households.  
 
Complementing the above findings, our micro-econometric case studies suggest that the 
poverty and inequality reducing effects of remittances vary considerably across different Latin 
American countries. Thus, when no imputations are made for the income of remittances senders, 
                                                                                                                                                             
characteristics that reduce households’ income generation capacity and increase their willingness to migrate – e.g. 
persistent unemployment, bad crops, etc. When this negative selection into migration driven by unobservable 
household characteristics prevail over positive selection effects, one could end up over-estimating households’ 
“potential income” prior to migration, which could explain the poverty-increasing remittances effects obtained for 
Mexico.  
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countries where recipients are concentrated at the bottom of the distribution of non-remittances 
income – e.g. Mexico, Paraguay, Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala – exhibit much higher 
reductions in poverty headcounts attributable to remittances. The fact that in those countries 
recipients are often found among relatively poorer households is arguably due to lower migration 
costs relative to household income, which in turn may be driven by the presence of well 
established migrant networks – associated with the countries’ migratory histories – and/or by the 
relative proximity to the countries’ main migrant destinations – e.g. as in the cases of Mexico 
and Paraguay. 
 
It is important to note, however, that when imputations are made for the income of 
remittances senders prior to migration, the magnitude of the average poverty reducing effect of 
remittances becomes much smaller. Indeed, those estimates suggest that in Latin America and 
the Caribbean remittances have reduced poverty headcounts by about 0.4 percent for each 
percentage point increase in the remittances to GDP ratio, a result that is remarkably similar to 
the one obtained in our cross-country analysis. While these effects are far from negligible, and 
migration and remittances do appear to have helped improving the living conditions of a large 
number of poor Latin American households, the region’s policy makers still face enormous 
challenges in terms of finding alternative means for addressing Latin America’s high levels of 
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Table 1. The impact of remittances on growth  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distance Distance Migration Migration Distance Migration
Level Growth Level Growth Level, Growth Level, Growth
GDP (t-1) 0.017 * 0.004 0.012 * 0.009 * 0.000 0.008 * 0.002 *
(3.05) (0.72) (2.4) (1.99) (-0.06) (1.77) (0.55)
Female education (t-1) -0.018 * -0.020 * -0.021 -0.013 ** -0.018 * -0.020 * -0.021 *
(-3) (-2.32) (-2.96) (-1.87) (-2.07) (-3.24) (-3.71)
Male education (t-1) 0.009 0.019 * 0.014 0.011 ** 0.020 * 0.017 * 0.025 *
(1.48) (2.4) (2.25) (1.86) (2.44) (2.93) (4.96)
Price of capital (t-1) -0.010 ** -0.009 ** -0.005 -0.009 * -0.005 -0.003 -0.007 *
(-1.86) (-1.78) (-1.25) (-2.06) (-1.09) (-0.94) (-2.29)
Remittances (t-1) 0.005 ** 0.012 * 0.012 * 0.008 * 0.013 * 0.011 * 0.009 *
(1.75) (3.48) (4.57) (3.45) (3.16) (4.46) (4.64)
Remittances (t-1) x LAC  0.000 0.002 -0.003 0.002 -0.008 0.000 0.003
(-0.05) (0.43) (-0.66) (0.49) (-1.39) (-0.22) (1.10)
Remittances in LAC 0.005 * 0.014 * 0.009 * 0.010 * 0.006 ** 0.011 * 0.012 *
p-val  0 0 .005 .001 .07 0 0
N 221 221 221 221 221 221 221
Sargan p-val 0.127 0.173 0.126 0.354 0.189 0.203 0.402
SOSC p-val 0.828 0.721 0.781 0.801 0.744 0.861 0.763
Dependent variable is per capita GDP growth
 
Notes: The table reports regression results with GDP growth as dependent variable; and GDP per capita (in logs), average years of secondary education of the female and male 
population, a measure of market distortion (given by the price of investment goods), remittances (as a percentage of GDP and in logs), and remittances interacted with a regional 
dummy for Latin America. t-stats in parenthesis; * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level. All the explanatory variables are lagged one period. All 
regressions include a constant. The regressions are performed using the system GMM estimator as indicated by the heading in each column.  The first column uses only lagged 
internal instruments. The second to seventh columns use lagged internal instruments for GDP per capita, average years of secondary education of the female and male 
population, and the measure of market distortion plus an external instrument which equals the per capita income level in the main migrant host countries weighted distance 
(Distance) or number of migrants (Migration). Level indicates that the external instrument is the value of the host countries per capita GDP series. Growth indicates that the 
external instrument is the growth rate of the host countries per capita GDP series. Level, growth combines the levels and growth instruments. Remittances in Latin America 
presents the value corresponding to the impact of Remittances on Latin American growth. 
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Table 2. The impact of remittances on Latin American inequality  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Distance Distance Migration Migration Distance Migration
Level Growth Level Growth Level, Growth Level, Growth
Gini (t-1) -0.101 * -0.110 * -0.102 * -0.085 * -0.103 * -0.075 * -0.097 *
(-19.59) (-16.72) (-44) (-23.43) (-41.78) (-15.07) (-22.94)
Female education (t-1) 0.024 * 0.018 * 0.014 * 0.017 * 0.022 * 0.017 * 0.018 *
(9.55) (4.02) (4.05) (4.37) (5.3) (5.59) (4.06)
Male education (t-1) -0.029 * -0.025 * -0.023 * -0.025 * -0.030 * -0.024 * -0.024 *
(-12.03) (-5.10) (-5.42) (-6.24) (-6.02) (-5.66) (-3.97)
Price of capital (t-1) -0.015 * -0.007 -0.006 -0.014 * -0.009 * -0.004 * -0.014 *
(-4.36) (-1.33) (-1.67) (-5.05) (-2.69) (-4.14) (-5.16)
Remittances (t-1) 0.007 * 0.010 * 0.011 * 0.008 * 0.009 * 0.005 * 0.008 *
(5.43) (5.61) (9.92) (6.59) (6.51) (5.99) (6.10)
Remittances (t-1) x LAC  -0.014 * -0.012 * -0.011 * -0.011 * -0.012 * -0.011 * -0.013 *
(-10.80) (-3.03) (-9.41) (-5.61) (-11.01) (-13.49) (-7.73)
Remittances in LAC -0.007 -0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006
p-val  0.000 0.600 0.950 0.030 0.140 0.000 0.000
N 85 85 85 85 85 85 85
Sargan p-val 0.808 0.989 0.909 0.972 0.864 0.975 0.988
SOSC p-val 0.306 0.214 0.188 0.239 0.240 0.275 0.276
Dependent variable is changes in the log gini
 
Notes: The table reports regression results with changes in the log Gini as dependent variable; and the Gini (in logs), average years of secondary education of the female and 
male population, a measure of market distortion (given by the price of investment goods), remittances (as a percentage of GDP in logs), and remittances interacted with a 
regional dummy for Latin America. t-stats in parenthesis; * indicates significance at the 5% level and ** at the 10% level. All the explanatory variables are lagged one period. 
All regressions include a constant. The regressions are performed using the system GMM estimator as indicated by the heading in each column.  The first column uses only 
internal instruments. The second to seventh columns use lagged internal instruments for the Gini, average years of secondary education of the female and male population, and 
the measure of market distortion plus an external instrument which equals the per capita income level in the main migrant host countries weighted distance (Distance) or number 
of migrants (Migration). Level indicates that the external instrument is the value of the host countries per capita GDP series. Growth indicates that the external instrument is the 
growth rate of the host countries per capita GDP series. Level, growth combines the levels and growth instruments. Remittances in Latin America presents the value 
corresponding to the impact of Remittances on Latin American growth. 
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Table 3. Poverty elasticity of remittances in Latin America  
ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
6 -1.17 -0.68 -0.46 -0.33 6 -0.94 -0.51 -0.32 -0.20
3 -0.56 -0.34 -0.24 -0.18 3 -0.59 -0.33 -0.20 -0.14
2 -0.32 -0.20 -0.15 -0.12 2 -0.40 -0.23 -0.15 -0.10
1.5 -0.19 -0.13 -0.10 -0.08 1.5 -0.29 -0.18 -0.12 -0.08
1 -0.07 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 1 -0.16 -0.11 -0.08 -0.06
ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
6 -0.53 -0.29 -0.17 -0.11 6 -0.92 -0.52 -0.33 -0.23
3 -0.35 -0.19 -0.12 -0.08 3 -0.52 -0.30 -0.19 -0.14
2 -0.25 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 2 -0.34 -0.20 -0.13 -0.10
1.5 -0.18 -0.11 -0.07 -0.05 1.5 -0.23 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07
1 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 -0.03 1 -0.12 -0.08 -0.06 -0.05
ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60 ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
6 -0.71 -0.40 -0.26 -0.18 6 -1.41 -0.80 -0.52 -0.37
3 -0.37 -0.22 -0.15 -0.11 3 -0.74 -0.44 -0.29 -0.21
2 -0.23 -0.14 -0.10 -0.07 2 -0.46 -0.28 -0.19 -0.14
1.5 -0.15 -0.10 -0.07 -0.05 1.5 -0.30 -0.19 -0.14 -0.11
1 -0.07 -0.05 -0.04 -0.03 1 -0.14 -0.10 -0.08 -0.06
ν/z 0.30 0.40 0.50 0.60
6 -1.49 -0.84 -0.55 -0.38
3 -0.80 -0.47 -0.31 -0.22
2 -0.49 -0.30 -0.21 -0.15
1.5 -0.33 -0.21 -0.15 -0.11











GMM, Distance, Level & Growth
Gini Coefficient
GMM, Migration, Level & Growth
Gini Coefficient
 
Notes: The table reports the estimated poverty elasticities of remittances/GDP for different values of the Gini 
coefficient and of per capita income to the poverty line ν/z.  It assumes an initial level of remittances of 10 percent of 
GDP 
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Table 4. Sources of Household Survey Data 
Country Year Survey
Bolivia 2002 Encuesta de Hogares, MECOVI
Ecuador 2004 Sistema Integrado de Encuestas de Hogares, INEC
El Salvador 2000 Encuesta de Hogares de Propositos Multiples, MECOVI
Guatemala 2000 Encuesta Nacional sobre Condiciones de Vida (ENCOVI)
Haiti 2001 Les Conditions de Vie en Haiti, IHSI/Fafo/PNUD
Honduras 2002 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares de Propositos Multiples, MECOVI
Mexico 2002 Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de los Hogares, INEGI
Nicaragua 2001 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares sobre Medicion de Nivel de Vida, INEC
Paraguay 2003 Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, Direccion General de Estadistica
Peru 2002 Encuesta Nacional de Hogares, INEI
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Table 5: Inequality Decompositions for Latin American and Caribbean Countries 
Bolivia (2002)
Non-Remittances Income 0.985 0.557 0.991 0.544 0.981 -0.004
Remittances 0.015 0.990 0.728 0.011 0.019 0.004
Total Income 1.000 0.555 1.000 0.555 1.000
Ecuador (2004)
Non-Remittances Income 0.964 0.505 0.980 0.477 0.957 -0.007
Remittances 0.036 0.969 0.620 0.022 0.043 0.007
Total Income 1.000 0.499 1.000 0.499 1.000
El Salvador (2000)
Non-Remittances Income 0.941 0.514 0.972 0.470 0.967 0.026
Remittances 0.059 0.910 0.303 0.016 0.033 -0.026
Total Income 1.000 0.486 1.000 0.486 1.000
Guatemala (2000)
Non-Remittances Income 0.969 0.596 0.986 0.569 0.973 0.004
Remittances 0.031 0.958 0.541 0.016 0.027 -0.004
Total Income 1.000 0.586 1.000 0.586 1.000
Haiti (2001)
Non-Remittances Income 0.794 0.670 0.926 0.493 0.736 -0.058
Remittances 0.206 0.916 0.937 0.177 0.264 0.058
Total Income 1.000 0.669 1.000 0.669 1.000
Honduras (2002)
Non-Remittances Income 0.933 0.572 0.971 0.518 0.927 -0.006
Remittances 0.067 0.954 0.634 0.041 0.073 0.006
Total Income 1.000 0.559 1.000 0.559 1.000
Mexico (2002)
Non-Remittances Income 0.980 0.491 0.987 0.475 0.988 0.008
Remittances 0.020 0.976 0.289 0.006 0.012 -0.008
Total Income 1.000 0.481 1.000 0.481 1.000
Nicaragua (2001)
Non-Remittances Income 0.976 0.517 0.992 0.501 0.966 -0.010
Remittances 0.024 0.959 0.773 0.018 0.034 0.010
Total Income 1.000 0.518 1.000 0.518 1.000
Paraguay (2003)
Non-Remittances Income 0.986 0.520 0.995 0.510 0.988 0.002
Remittances 0.014 0.985 0.437 0.006 0.012 -0.002
Total Income 1.000 0.516 1.000 0.516 1.000
Peru (2002)
Non-Remittances Income 0.989 0.476 0.992 0.467 0.980 -0.009
Remittances 0.011 0.989 0.865 0.009 0.020 0.009
Total Income 1.000 0.476 1.000 0.476 1.000
* Effects of a 1% increase in per capita income from different sources on the Gini coefficient of Total Income.
% Share in Gini 
of Total Income
Marginal Effect 
on Gini of Total 
Income*
Contribution to 
Gini of Total 
Income
Country








Table 6: Remittances-Receiving Households in the Income Distribution for various Income Definitions  
Remittances and Reported Non-Remittances Income
NR Income Quintiles Mexico (2002) Guatemala (2000) El Salvador (2000) Paraguay (2003) Honduras (2002) Bolivia (2002) Ecuador (2004) Haiti (2001) Peru (2002) Nicaragua (2001)
1 60.66 31.77 33.96 42.09 26.76 28.79 34.70 22.65 5.79 12.05
2 14.86 15.25 19.35 16.64 16.02 16.79 18.49 16.76 13.17 14.51
3 12.43 19.55 15.37 18.08 18.76 13.61 14.65 17.37 17.31 18.30
4 7.89 15.87 16.59 14.86 21.09 17.20 15.89 18.26 24.22 22.63
5 4.05 17.58 14.66 8.32 17.42 23.59 16.24 24.79 39.35 32.58
 
Remittances and Imputed Non-Remittances Income (Counterfactual Scenario)
NR Income Quintiles Mexico (2002) Guatemala (2000) El Salvador (2000) Paraguay (2003) Honduras (2002) Bolivia (2002) Ecuador (2004) Haiti (2001) Peru (2002) Nicaragua (2001)
1 25.12 21.54 18.29 21.14 10.48 17.26 15.74 15.26 1.76 10.34
2 26.68 20.98 21.94 23.87 20.31 20.69 19.53 16.61 7.48 14.71
3 22.39 16.29 20.05 20.92 23.13 17.66 19.72 17.85 16.22 18.50
4 17.63 16.48 20.47 19.83 23.21 18.83 22.03 20.90 27.35 22.36
5 8.11 24.70 19.24 14.28 22.89 25.58 23.09 29.43 47.04 34.20
Remittances and Total Income (including remittances)
Total Income Quintiles Mexico (2002) Guatemala (2000) El Salvador (2000) Paraguay (2003) Honduras (2002) Bolivia (2002) Ecuador (2004) Haiti (2001) Peru (2002) Nicaragua (2001)
1 26.38 8.77 12.43 18.90 3.95 12.28 6.93 6.12 0.38 8.40
2 23.42 14.23 21.70 20.32 13.17 15.16 13.10 13.83 6.06 12.16
3 21.73 25.77 21.76 20.45 21.65 16.65 17.65 19.74 15.67 18.26
4 16.39 26.76 22.90 21.30 29.45 19.89 27.78 24.08 26.10 24.71




Table 7: Remittances-Receiving Households in the Distribution of Household Assets and Education  
Remittances and HH Assets Index
HH Assets Quintiles Mexico (2002) Guatemala (2000) El Salvador (2000) Paraguay (2003) Honduras (2002) Bolivia (2002) Ecuador (2004) Haiti (2001) Peru (2002) Nicaragua (2001)
1 17.01 13.46 11.00 12.98 N/A N/A N/A 10.00 2.09 6.46
2 28.52 16.86 16.06 24.65 N/A N/A N/A 12.98 2.52 9.35
3 23.76 19.95 22.74 23.39 N/A N/A N/A 15.44 8.97 14.32
4 20.86 22.77 26.04 20.13 N/A N/A N/A 23.30 24.50 26.76
5 9.97 27.74 24.23 18.75 N/A N/A N/A 39.51 62.09 43.50
Note: HH Assets Index constructed using First Principal Components technique. 
Remittances and Education
(% of HHs receiving remittances by average years of education of adults)
Years of Education Mexico (2002) Guatemala (2000) El Salvador (2000) Paraguay (2003) Honduras (2002) Bolivia (2002) Ecuador (2004) Haiti (2001) Peru (2002) Nicaragua (2001)
0 10.88 8.24 23.16 7.65 7.96 6.88 5.87 18.59 1.76 10.87
1-4 13.11 6.42 18.00 4.79 6.97 2.08 2.34 25.17 0.65 8.17
5-7 6.46 6.29 19.77 4.20 12.66 2.35 3.09 37.99 0.89 14.34
8-11 3.09 6.32 19.68 3.19 16.11 3.34 3.77 44.89 3.48 24.19
12 + 2.06 4.54 17.52 2.80 12.72 4.71 5.23 57.12 5.35 29.46
All HHs 5.82 6.56 19.32 3.83 10.88 3.47 3.97 27.21 2.82 15.64
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Table 8: Remittances and Inequality in Counterfactual Scenario of No-Migration  
Bolivia (2002)
Before Remittances 0.557 0.556
95% Confidence Interval (0.553; 0.561)
After Remittances 0.555 0.555
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -0.446 (-0.293) -0.267 (-0.175)
Ecuador (2004)
Before Remittances 0.505 0.501
95% Confidence Interval (0.500; 0.503)
After Remittances 0.499 0.499
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -1.245 (-0.333) -0.457 (-0.122)
El Salvador (2000)
Before Remittances 0.514 0.497
95% Confidence Interval (0.494; 0.501)
After Remittances 0.486 0.486
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -5.370 (-0.856) -2.133 (-0.340)
Guatemala (2000)
Before Remittances 0.596 0.603
95% Confidence Interval (0.596; 0.615)
After Remittances 0.586 0.586
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -1.761 (-0.550) -2.901 (-0.907)
Haiti (2001)
Before Remittances 0.670 0.725
95% Confidence Interval (0.703; 0.756)
After Remittances 0.669 0.669
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -0.086 (-0.003) -7.666 (-0.295)
Honduras (2002)
Before Remittances 0.572 0.565
95% Confidence Interval (0.564; 0.567)
After Remittances 0.559 0.559
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -2.321 (-0.323) -1.111 (-0.155)
Mexico (2002)
Before Remittances 0.491 0.477
95% Confidence Interval (0.477; 0.478)
After Remittances 0.481 0.481
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -2.125 (-1.041) 0.748 (0.366)
Nicaragua (2001)
Before Remittances 0.517 0.528
95% Confidence Interval (0.519; 0.539)
After Remittances 0.518 0.518
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) 0.260 (0.106) -1.828 (-0.744)
Paraguay (2003)
Before Remittances 0.520 0.515
95% Confidence Interval (0.514; 0.517)
After Remittances 0.516 0.516
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -0.734 (-0.517) 0.230 (0.162)
Peru (2002)
Before Remittances 0.476 0.478
95% Confidence Interval (0.476; 0.481)
After Remittances 0.476 0.476
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) 0.086 (0.077) -0.333 (-0.299)








Table 9: Remittances and Poverty Headcount in Counterfactual Scenario of No-Migration 
Bolivia (2002)
Before Remittances 18.400 17.999 35.261 35.052
95% Confidence Interval (17.842; 18.184) (34.824; 35.279)
After Remittances 17.764 17.764 34.674 34.674
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -3.457 (-2.270) -1.306 (-0.857) -1.665 (-1.093) -1.078 (-0.708)
Ecuador (2004)
Before Remittances 12.531 11.665 28.849 28.082
95% Confidence Interval (11.594; 11.741) (27.960; 28.221)
After Remittances 11.198 11.198 27.147 27.147
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -10.638 (-2.849) -4.003 (-1.072) -5.900 (-1.580) -3.330 (-0.892)
El Salvador (2000)
Before Remittances 12.116 8.215 23.743 20.055
95% Confidence Interval (8.077; 8.375) (19.824; 20.311)
After Remittances 7.700 7.700 18.607 18.607
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -36.448 (-5.813) -6.269 (-1.000) -21.632 (-3.450) -7.220 (-1.152)
Guatemala (2000)
Before Remittances 24.413 23.630 41.715 41.379
95% Confidence Interval (23.335; 23.931) (41.055; 41.710)
After Remittances 21.578 21.578 39.087 39.087
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -11.613 (-3.630) -8.684 (-2.714) -6.300 (-1.969) -5.539 (-1.731)
Haiti (2001)
Before Remittances 60.229 57.541 76.343 74.376
95% Confidence Interval (56.929; 58.138) (73.793; 74.992)
After Remittances 53.425 53.425 71.414 71.414
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -11.297 (-0.435) -7.153 (-0.276) -6.456 (-0.249) -3.982 (-0.153)
Honduras (2002)
Before Remittances 18.681 16.715 34.772 33.155
95% Confidence Interval (16.608; 16.820) (32.993; 33.307)
After Remittances 16.155 16.155 31.731 31.731
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -13.522 (-1.883) -3.350 (-0.467) -8.746 (-1.218) -4.295 (-0.598)
Mexico (2002)
Before Remittances 5.268 3.079 15.029 12.603
95% Confidence Interval (3.019; 3.145) (12.480; 12.731)
After Remittances 3.165 3.165 12.695 12.695
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -39.920 (-19.561) 2.793 (1.369) -15.530 (-7.610) 0.730 (0.358)
Nicaragua (2001)
Before Remittances 8.763 8.226 23.323 22.848
95% Confidence Interval (8.012; 8.528) (22.427; 23.345)
After Remittances 8.260 8.260 22.552 22.552
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -5.740 (-2.334) 0.413 (0.168) -3.306 (-1.344) -1.296 (-0.527)
Paraguay (2003)
Before Remittances 6.839 6.066 16.188 15.373
95% Confidence Interval (5.999; 6.145) (15.256; 15.521)
After Remittances 6.057 6.057 15.333 15.333
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -11.434 (-8.053) -0.148 (-0.104) -5.282 (-3.720) -0.260 (-0.183)
Peru (2002)
Before Remittances 4.193 4.186 15.644 15.555
95% Confidence Interval (4.186; 4.192) (15.533; 15.888)
After Remittances 4.185 4.185 15.539 15.539
% Change (elasticity w.r.t rem/inc) -0.191 (-0.172) -0.024 (-0.021) -0.671 (-0.603) -0.103 (-0.092)
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys for each country. Poverty lines are 1 and 2 dollars respectively, expressed at PPP values.
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Table 10: Remittances and Poverty Gap in Counterfactual Scenario of No-Migration 
% Change Elasticity % Change Elasticity % Change Elasticity % Change Elasticity
Bolivia - 2002    
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -0.83 (-0.547)  (-0.37; 0.75)  (-0.24; 0.49) -1.48 (-0.970) (-0.27; 1.08)  (-0.18; 0.71)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -1.12 (-0.735) (-0.39; 0.39) (-0.26; 0.26) -1.88 (-1.232) (-0.56; 0.57) (-0.37; 0.37)
Ecuador - 2004        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -9.31 (-2.493) (-1.21; -0.49) (-0.32; -0.13) -18.42 (-4.932) (-2.89; -1.67) (-0.77; -0.45)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -4.17 (-1.118) (-0.91; -0.23) (-0.24; -0.06) -8.55 (-2.289) (-1.52; -0.77) (-0.41; -0.21)
El Salvador - 2000        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -16.56 (-2.641) (1.36; 3.94) (0.22; 0.63) -36.44 (-5.812) (2.59; 5.73) (0.41; 0.91)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -15.64 (-2.494) (-0.07; 0.67) (-0.01; 0.11) -26.74 (-4.265) (0.74; 3.04) (0.12; 0.49)
Guatemala - 2000        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -6.24 (-1.950) (-4.05; -2.43) (-1.27; -0.76) -11.60 (-3.625) (-6.98; -4.76) (-2.18; -1.49)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -4.41 (-1.379) (-2.91; -1.84) (-0.91; -0.58) -8.19 (-2.561) (-5.39; -3.66) (-1.69; -1.14)
Haiti - 2001        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -5.29 (-0.204) (-3.39; -1.96) (-0.13; -0.08) -9.24 (-0.356) (-5.28; -3.36) (-0.20; -0.13)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -4.99 (-0.192) (-3.46; -2.48) (-0.13; -0.10) -8.02 (-0.309) (-5.31; -3.72) (-0.21; -0.14)
Honduras - 2002        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -10.64 (-1.482) (0.24; 1.23) (0.03; 0.17) -21.55 (-3.001) (0.44; 1.79) (0.06; 0.25)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -4.97 (-0.693) (0.20; 1.03) (0.03; 0.14) -9.86 (-1.373) (0.33; 1.33) (0.05; 0.19)
Mexico - 2002        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -45.68 (-22.384) (-0.84; 2.17) (-0.41; 1.06) -72.54 (-35.543) (-1.19; 2.47) (-0.58; 1.21)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -19.08 (-9.351) (-0.30; 1.54) (-0.15; 0.76) -36.48 (-17.876) (-0.11; 2.55) (-0.05; 1.25)
Nicaragua - 2001        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -3.88 (-1.579) (-0.91; 3.31) (-0.37; 1.35) -8.58 (-3.488) (-0.19; 5.03) (-0.08; 2.05)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -1.31 (-0.531) (-0.70; 1.92) (-0.29; 0.78) -3.47 (-1.411) (-0.40; 3.31) (-0.16; 1.35)
Paraguay - 2003        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -9.11 (-6.419) (-1.57; 0.27) (-1.11; 0.19) -18.74 (-13.201) (-1.98; 0.51) (-1.39; 0.36)
Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day -4.59 (-3.233) (-0.71; 0.48) (-0.50; 0.34) -9.07 (-6.385) (-0.82; 0.83) (-0.58; 0.59)
Peru - 2002        
Less than US$ 1 (PPP) a day -0.23 (-0.209) (0.00; 0.12) (0.00; 0.11) -0.59 (-0.532) (0.00; 0.15) (0.00; 0.14)
  Less than US$ 2 (PPP) a day 0.08 (0.070) (-0.08; 0.16) (-0.07; 0.14) 0.16 (0.147) (-0.07; 0.23) (-0.06; 0.21)
Source: Author's calculations based on Household Surveys for each country. Poverty lines are 1 and 2 dollars respectively, expressed at PPP values.
Note: 95% confidence interval for columns using imputed non-remittances income.
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Figure 1: Remittances to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2004 (% of GDP and US$ millions) 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Own calculations using IMF, World Economic Outlook Database. 
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